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International Licensing Revisited:  
The Role of Copyright and Trademark Enforcement Strength 
 
 
Abstract 
This study explores the instrumental role that copyright and trademark enforcement strength 
plays in stimulating licensing flows in 21 countries. In so doing, we use a panel data 
methodology to investigate the relationship between trademark and copyright enforcement 
strength levels of 21 countries and the choice between unaffiliated and affiliated licensing of 
US firms. The evidence suggests that both copyright and trademark enforcement strength 
have a highly significant effect on licensing and, more specifically, that stronger levels of 
enforcement stimulate higher levels of unaffiliated licensing. 
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1. Introduction 
This study investigates the role of copyright and trademark enforcement strength on 
stimulating licensing flows in 21 countries, by examining the tendency and preference of US 
firms to serve foreign markets by licensing their assets out to external non-affiliated 
companies or by operating with a hierarchical mode in order to protect their assets internally. 
The effect of intellectual property (IP) protection on the internationalisation of US firms has 
received much attention in the international business literature (Nicholson, 2007; 
Nunnenkamp and Spatz, 2004). This is because IP assets such as copyright and trademarks 
now play a central role in the formation of business models and competitive advantage of 
US firms (Idris, 2003). Indeed, the significance of trademark and copyright assets in building 
and supporting the brands of US firms is evidenced by the exponential growth in the value of 
the brands of top performing US firms across all industries over the last twenty years. For 
example, in 2014 the value of two US brands (Apple and Google) exceeded for the first time 
the $100 billion threshold (Interbrand, 2014). In total, the value of IP held by US firms 
represents approximately 45% of the total US GDP (Shapiro and Hassett, 2005). In addition, 
the total value of UK IP exports exceeded £110 billion in 2009 (IP Office, 2011), while IPR 
intensive industries of the European Union (EU) generate almost 90% of all EU external 
trade and support directly or indirectly 35% of EU jobs (EPO & OHIM, 2013). 
A key challenge that firms face when internationalising abroad is to gain protection for 
their IP assets and successfully enforce their IP rights in foreign countries. In order to 
maintain the competitive advantage gained from their investment in intangible assets, firms 
need to be able to appropriate the returns on their investments on IP assets such as copyright 
and trademarks in an effective manner. However, the IP assets of firms are often the victim 
of IP infringement. Infringement can take place in the form of piracy which relates to the 
unauthorized use or reproduction of copyrighted material and counterfeiting which relates to 
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the imitation of a product protected by patents or trademark (or both) without the owner’s 
consent (Urbas, 2000). Even though many countries have directed significant resources and 
scaled up their efforts to tackle counterfeiting and piracy, the infringement of IP assets is a 
growing problem (USTR, 2014). For example, the global value of counterfeit and pirated 
products is estimated to have grown almost threefold in a seven-year period between 2008 
and 2015 (BASCAP, 2011). IP asset owners experience significant losses from the sale of IP 
infringing assets. For example, it is estimated that the clothing footwear and accessories 
industries of the EU experience €26.3 billion of revenue losses annually due to 
counterfeiting (OHIM, 2015a), while the cosmetics and personal care industries of the EU 
experience losses of €4.7 billion (OHIM, 2015b), and the EU sports goods industry €500 
million in losses (OHIM, 2015c).  
 While gaining protection and enforcing their IP rights may be a familiar process for 
firms at home, this becomes a significant challenge when operating abroad. The enforcement 
of IP rights requires an IP system where, for example, the judicial system upholds the rights 
of IP owners and police and customs authorities carry out successful enforcement operations 
(Papageorgiadis et al, 2014). This requires a substantial commitment of resources (monetary 
and human) by firms to proactively and reactively engage with IP enforcement authorities in 
order to help enforce their rights in practice. However, the levels of IP enforcement strength 
vary dramatically between countries, especially regarding the quality of enforcement of laws 
on IP infringement (OECD, 2008; Papageorgiadis et al, 2014). For example, criminal 
sanctions may not be regularly imposed, fines may be preferred to more severe penalties (the 
potential of imprisonment) and when fines are preferred the maximum or at least a high 
penalty might not be imposed, reducing the deterrence effect of such actions (Commission of 
the European Communities, 2009). It seems reasonable to suggest that IP infringement 
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would be a significantly smaller problem for firms if effective IP enforcement occurred 
worldwide. 
This study makes a novel contribution to understanding this problem by empirically 
studying the effect of national copyright and trademark enforcement strength on US 
licensing flows internationally. Previous research by Park and Lippoldt, (2008) focused on 
the effect of copyright and trademark legislative strength on US licensing flows while other 
researchers have focused on the effect of patent legislative and actual enforcement strength 
on licensing (Papageorgiadis et al., 2013; Yang and Maskus, 2001). However, previous 
research has been restricted from studying the effect of copyright and trademark 
enforcement strength due to the limited availability of secondary data to enable a panel 
econometric analysis. We use the two longitudinal indices of copyright and trademark 
enforcement strength developed by Papageorgiadis (2010), which capture the effectiveness 
and efficiency with which copyrights and trademarks are enforced in 21 countries and apply 
these in the context of US firms. We find that both copyright and trademark enforcement 
strength have a highly significant effect on licensing and, particularly, we find that stronger 
levels of enforcement stimulate higher levels of unaffiliated licensing. This suggests that in 
countries where the enforcement of copyright and trademark is strong, US firms experience 
significantly lower levels of transaction costs in enforcing their rights in practice and 
therefore find it optimal to trust the collaboration with non-affiliated parties by licensing out 
their IP assets.  
In the next section we discuss the theoretical considerations that underpin our study 
while section three presents the data and model specification. Section four discusses the 
results and section five provides some concluding remarks.  
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2. Theoretical considerations 
Licensing can be defined as a bilateral contractual agreement between two parties that 
enables an individual entity or firm (the licensee) to use the physical or intangible assets of 
the other party (the licensor) for a certain period of time and for a monetary or other return 
(Posner, 2005). Licensing can be categorised into affiliated and unaffiliated licensing. 
Affiliated (i.e. internal) licensing involves a contractual relationship between related 
companies, where an affiliated subsidiary is allowed to use the assets of the parent firm, in 
return for compensation, typically in the form of royalty and fee payments. Affiliate licensing 
occurs when a foreign company invests in a market, thereby creating a new company which 
belongs to the parent firm. Unaffiliated licensing is an alternative to the Foreign Direct 
Investment (FDI) entry mode where a contractual relationship takes place between unrelated 
firms. In such a relationship the asset owner licenses the exploitation of proprietary assets to 
external companies (Anderson and Gatignon, 1986; Contractor, 1981; 1984).  
The internationalization of firms depends on the attributes of factors evident in the 
internal and external environment. The choice to enter an international market depends on the 
company’s own firm-specific advantages (FSAs) as well as country-specific advantages 
(CSAs) – see Rugman and Verbeke (2001). FSAs relate to the unique (and difficult to 
replicate) capabilities of a company which provide it with a competitive advantage when 
active in the market. Such advantages can be IP assets in the form of technology, trademarks, 
marketing expertise and distribution skills. This notion is in line with the resource-based view 
of the firm which proposes that companies derive their competitive advantage primarily from 
the above average returns generated by valuable, heterogeneous and not perfectly mobile 
resources which they have at their disposal (Barney, 2001; Miller and Shamsie, 1996; 
Wernerfelt, 1984), of which knowledge-based or intellectual assets such as IP are important 
examples.  
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Such resources can also have an effect on the choice between licensing and FDI, since 
a company whose valuable intellectual assets in the form of copyrights and trademarks 
cannot be licensed effectively and securely (in terms of IP protection and enforcement) to an 
external party is likely to prefer to exploit those IP assets within its own hierarchical 
structures in order to mitigate the potential risk of leakage and imitation (Peteraf, 1993). This 
choice follows a transaction costs rationale which is predicated upon the assumption that 
organisations can successfully improve efficiency by reducing their exposure to transaction-
specific costs (Williamson, 1993).  
In order to understand the costs that occur in the transaction process, it is useful to 
first define what a transaction is. A transaction is the action that accrues from the transfer of a 
tangible or intangible asset (such as copyrights and trademarks) between a “technologically 
separable interface” (Williamson 1981, p. 552). Such assets can take the form of both goods 
and services (Williamson, 1993). Inefficient co-operation between economic actors (private 
or public organisations) involved in a transaction engender costs to the organisation. A 
transaction cost is the cost incurred in making an economic exchange or, in other words, the 
cost of participating in a market. Transaction costs are embedded in the perils associated with 
the de facto notion of incomplete contracting (Williamson, 1996). Contracting costs appear 
both prior to and after a contract is signed and their level of importance depends on the 
predicted guarantees embodied in the contract and the associated calculated risk (limited by 
incompleteness of the contract) (Williamson, 1993). The identification and measurement of 
transaction costs can help to explain the proposition that a firm’s mode of internationalisation 
to a foreign market is primarily determined by the level of control it can govern (Hennart, 
2000; Zhao et al., 2004). In the event of market failure, where the transactions costs of 
dealing in an external market are higher than internal organisation costs, this external 
inefficiency can be overcome using the internal organisation of an MNE (Hennart, 2000; 
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Buckley and Casson, 1976) through hierarchical, equity-intensive modes (i.e. FDI) rather 
than arm’s length contracting (i.e. non-affiliate licensing). This notion is at the heart of 
Buckley and Casson’s (1976) internalisation theory of the MNE (but see also Hennart 1986, 
1989, 2000), and forms a component of Dunning’s (1988) Eclectic Paradigm. 
Country-specific advantages differ to FSAs in that they relate to unique and 
favourable features offered by a country to foreign firms. Such advantages include, inter alia, 
large market size, attractive production conditions, low political risk, relevant and low cost 
natural resources endowments and competitively priced labour (Rugman and Verbeke, 2001). 
One of the CSAs commonly considered by such studies is the level of intellectual property 
enforcement offered by the country (Papageorgiadis et al., 2014). IP-owning companies that 
internationalise can profit from their valuable proprietary intellectual property such as 
copyright and trademarks, by licensing to affiliates or unaffiliated concerns in foreign 
markets. In countries that offer strong levels of copyright and trademark enforcement, firms 
are able to license their IP assets out to unaffiliated companies. This is because strong 
copyright and trademark enforcement levels provide reassurance to the owners of IP that 
should their licensees or other parties infringe their rights, the IP owner will be able to 
mobilize the local enforcement (and related) agencies to effectively and efficiently enforce 
their rights in practice.  
There has been little research concerning the effect of IP protection and enforcement 
and this has been mainly done from the patent protection and enforcement perspective. Firms 
are found to license their IP to unaffiliated companies in countries offering strong patent 
protection levels in terms of book law rather than the actual enforcement of patent related 
legislation (Smith, 2001; Yang and Maskus, 2001; Nicholson, 2007). This has generally been 
found to be the case for the period covering the mid-80s to the mid-90s. In contrast, empirical 
analysis for later years found stronger patent protection to induce more affiliate than 
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unaffiliated licensing (Papageorgiadis et al, 2013; Puttitanun, 2006), especially for 
developing countries (Park and Lippoldt, 2004). In addition, Papageorgiadis et al. (2013), 
conclude that firms are more likely to license to unaffiliated than affiliate parties, when patent 
enforcement is strong within a country.  
In terms of copyright protection and enforcement, Park and Lippoldt (2004) found 
that book law copyright and trademark protection have no significant effect on affiliate or 
unaffiliated licensing activity. But it is important to note that, there has been no study carried 
out so far on the effect of copyright and trademark enforcement on affiliate and unaffiliated 
licensing activity. This is therefore the focus of this paper. To explore this relationship we 
specifically test the following hypothesis:  
H: High levels of copyright and trademark enforcement strength positively affect the 
tendency and preference of U.S. companies to license out to unaffiliated than affiliated firms. 
 
3. Data and Model Specification   
We use panel data analysis to develop a model in order to explain the relationship between 
affiliated licensing transactions by US firms and the effects of trademark and copyright 
enforcement across 21 countries covering the period 1998-2011. The US licensing 
transactions data enable us to distinctively identify the preference of US firms to license 
assets that are related to IP internally to affiliated companies (via FDI and joint ventures) or 
to unaffiliated external companies.  
The data employed covers 21 countries: Argentina, China, Chile, India, Indonesia, 
Malaysia, Mexico, Philippines Thailand, Australia, France, Germany, Hong-Kong, Israel, 
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Japan, Netherlands, New Zealand, Singapore, Spain, Switzerland and the United Kingdom 
(Table 1 provides the descriptive statistics of the variables used in the estimation).   
----------------------Table 1 around here------------------------- 
3.1 Dependent Variable 
We use the U.S. Direct Investment Abroad:  Royalties and License Fees and Other 
Private Services data by the US Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA). We follow the 
Papageorgiadis et al. (2013) approach for the construction of the dependent variable in our 
model, which is calculated as the ratio of affiliated licensing receipts to total licensing 
receipts for each country. This approach purports to gauge the proclivity of US firms to 
engage in transactions with affiliated rather than unaffiliated foreign entities when licensing 
abroad. The novelty of this approach is that the use of a single data type affords a distinction 
to be made between external and internal licensing transactions.1  
 
3.2 Independent and Control Variables  
3.2.1 Trademark and copyright enforcement strength 
The main independent variables used to proxy the effects of trademark and copyright 
enforcement in this study originate from the work of Papageorgiadis (2010) in which a 
conceptual framework is adopted in line with institutional and transaction cost theories which 
effectively constructs two indices measuring copyright and trademark enforcement over the 
period 1998-2007. In particular, each of the indices comprises four constructs – namely 
                                                            
1 We recognise the possible limitation associated with the data used to construct the dependent variable in that 
there may be an amount of licensing (affiliated and unaffiliated) which goes unreported. Given that this dataset 
was used by previous studies in the literature (enabling the comparison of the results of this study, with those of 
previous studies in the literature) and that the availability of licensing data is scarce (making the BEA dataset 
almost unique) we assume that any potential unreported fees due to transfer pricing practices have a marginal 
effect on the reliability of the dependent variable. 
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search costs, servicing costs, property rights protection costs and monitoring costs that are 
quantified using secondary data. The index builds on and extends the work of Reynolds 
(2004) that measures the legislative aspects of copyright and trademark protection. The 
resulting novel index by Papageorgiadis (2010) captures the enforcement-related transactions 
costs that firms face when engaging with copyright and patent systems in foreign countries. 
As explained by Papageorgiadis (2010) such costs can emerge from the interaction with 
national intellectual property enforcement agencies (e.g. trading standards officers) that are 
responsible for ensuring the effective enforcement of IP owners’ rights. With regards to the 
effect of the two indices on US licensing transactions, we expect a negative relationship 
between weak levels of copyright and trademark enforcement and the ratio of affiliated 
licensing total licensing receipts (the dependent variable). The weaker the copyright and 
trademark enforcement in a country, the more likely that US firms will internalise 
transactions to protect their IP through the use of affiliated licensing.  
3.2.2 Other control variables 
Our selection of control variables is premised on existing variables widely incorporated in 
previous studies in the literature. The two key control variables used are GDP per capita and 
population size. These account for the effect of market size as a factor attracting foreign 
investments (see Henisz, 2000; Park and Lippoldt, 2004; Yang and Maskus, 2001; Nicholson, 
2007; Seyoum, 2006). Previous empirical studies suggest that larger markets have a positive 
impact on FDI levels, with smaller markets being more likely to be served via unaffiliated 
companies (Chakrabarti, 2001; Nunnenkamp and Spatz, 2002; Pfister and Deffains, 2005). 
Two additional proxies also feature in the econometric model seeking to capture the 
extent to which countries are open to FDI - through minimizing tariff and non-tariff barriers - 
as well as offer investment freedom to improve the investment climate and attract foreign 
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investments (Bengoa and Sanchez-Robles, 2003; Contractor, 1985, 1990; Quazi, 2007). We 
use a) the Investment Freedom Index published in the Index of Economic Freedom report of 
the Heritage Foundation (various years) and b) the ratio of FDI stock to GDP to account for 
the FDI openness of a country. In this context, higher levels of openness to FDI flows and 
economic freedom are expected to attract higher levels of affiliated investments. In contrast, 
US firms are expected to serve a market via unaffiliated parties when investment freedom and 
openness to FDI is low (Bengoa and Sanchez-Robles, 2003; Contractor, 1985, 1990; Quazi, 
2007).  
Furthermore, we also incorporate a proxy for the effect of exchange rate volatility on 
affiliated and unaffiliated licensing transactions (Maskus, 2000). In countries where exchange 
rate volatility is high, US firms are expected to license their IP rights internally to affiliated 
parties in order to mitigate the risk by advancing or delaying the timing of payments back to 
the US parent firm when the exchange rate becomes favourable (Papageorgiadis, et al, 2013). 
We therefore anticipate a positive relationship between high levels of exchange rate volatility 
and affiliated licensing.   
In addition, following the previous literature (Buckley et al., 2007) we control for the 
effect of political risk in a foreign market using the political risk variable of the International 
Country Risk Guide (ICRG) published by the PRS group (PRS Group, 2015). Higher values 
in the political risk index indicate countries that experience relative political stability, 
whereas lower values indicate politically unstable countries. Therefore, we expect a positive 
relationship between political stability and affiliated licensing transactions which enable 
foreign firms to fully appropriate the returns of their IP in the country, and use unaffiliated 
parties to serve the market when political risk is high in order not to commit to overseas 
investments (Contractor, 1985, 1990; Pfister and Deffains, 2005).  
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We also use data on the geographic distance between the US and the 21 countries, by 
calculating the kilometric distance between Washington DC and the capital city of each 
country in question (Stein and Daude, 2007). We expect a positive relationship between 
greater levels of geographic distance between the home and host country and the dependent 
variable, with US firms preferring to internalise transactions using affiliated companies in 
order to overcome communication, managerial and monitoring costs (Maskus, 2000).  
In addition to geographic distance, we also control for the potential effect of countries 
being members of the Eurozone, namely France, Germany, Spain and the Netherlands  
(Clegg and Cross, 2000). In so doing, we construct a binary variable and allocate the value of 
“1” to the four countries in our sample which are members of the Eurozone and “0” when 
not. We anticipate a positive relationship between membership of the euro and the dependent 
variable, since US firms are more likely to internalise transactions by licensing to affiliate 
companies in order to achieve economies of scale via gaining access to multiple investment 
locations within the economically integrated region (Clegg and Cross, 2000).  
Finally, we calculate the cultural distance between the US and each country in our 
dataset using the scores developed by Hofstede (2001) and following the methodology of 
Kogut and Singh (1988). We anticipate higher levels of cultural distance to have a positive 
relationship with affiliated licensing, since it will be optimal and more efficient for US firms 
to serve the market via internal organisation, rather than have to manage such cultural 
differences with external parties.    
3.2.3 Model Specification  
For the empirical investigation we have adopted a panel data analysis (Baltagi, 2001). In 
estimating the model a data-set was used which comprises N cross-sectional units, denoted i 
=  1.….,N, observed at each of T time periods, denoted t = 1.…..T.  We have a total of TN 
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observations and y is a (TN×1) vector of endogenous variables and X is a (TN×k) matrix of 
exogenous variables, which does not include a column of units for the constant term.  The 
generalized regression model for our basic framework is as follows: 
yit = αi + βi′xit  + εit                   (1)        
εit ∼ i.i.d. (0, σi
2 ) 
where αi is a scalar and βi is a (k × 1) vector of slope coefficients. The underlying 
assumptions are similar variances between countries (i.e. σi
2 = σε2 ∀i ) and zero covariances 
(i.e. Cov ( εit . εjs ) = 0 for i ≠ j. 
Equation 2 below expresses the ratio of licensing receipts from affiliated to total licensing 
receipts as a function of a string of independent variables.  
LRit =α0 +α1Xit +Dit +εit       (2) 
it i itv uε = +  
where LRit is the ratio of total licensing receipts by affiliated to total licensing receipts, Xit  
consists of a number of variables that test the hypothesis stated above, Dit  is a dummy 
variable, εt is the disturbance term, vi captures the unobserved country-specific effect while 
uit is the idiosyncratic error. This is a one-way error component regression model, where vi ~  
IIN (0, σ
2
 ) and independent of uit  ~ IIN (0, σ
2
 ). In passing it should be mentioned that, apart 
from the dummy variable, the natural logarithm of each variable is used.2 
 
                                                            
2 The heteroskedastic nature of time series as well as the interpretation of the coefficients of transformed 
variables as elasticities is two valid reasons why logarithmic transformations in econometrics are used.  
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4. Interpretation of Results and Discussion 
Various regression specifications were explored and subjected to a series of testing to ensure 
validity and robustness. More specifically, the White heteroskedasticity consistent covariance 
estimator with ordinary least squares estimation was used to ensure that the standard errors 
are robust. The Durbin–Wu–Hausman test for endogeneity was employed in an attempt to 
identify and effectively address potential limitations in the model. Additionally, the variance 
inflation factor (VIF) as well as the cross correlations (see Table 2) of the variables suggested 
that existing collinear relationships were kept to their minimum as the average VIF score was 
below 2 when a common rule of thumb is that VIF scores higher that 10 may constitute a 
legitimate reason for concern. 
----------------------Table 2 around here------------------------- 
We estimate three different models, namely the pooled, fixed effects and random 
effects models. On the basis of the selection criteria, i.e. F-test, Hausman and LM tests, the 
fixed effects model is preferred. The estimated lagged specifications returned insignificant 
coefficients and were therefore dropped from the final estimation process. The results are 
reported on Table 3 below. 
----------------------Table 3 around here------------------------- 
The results show a strong relationship between the ratio of US affiliated to total 
licensing and the majority of the independent variables. The coefficient of determination (R2) 
in both estimated models suggests that a relatively high percentage of the variation in the 
dependent variable for both models is adequately explained by variations in the independent 
variables. The coefficients of trademark enforcement (model 1) and copyright enforcement 
(model 2) strength indices are significant at the 1% level bearing the expected negative signs 
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across both specifications. This indicates that an increase in the trademark and copyright 
enforcement strength levels of a country will stifle affiliated licensing. The results confirm 
our hypothesis that higher levels of copyright and trademark enforcement strength positively 
affect the tendency and preference of U.S. companies to license out to unaffiliated than 
affiliated firms. The findings also provide support to the propositions of internalisation theory 
(Nicholson, 2007; Park and Lippoldt, 2001; Yang and Maskus, 2001). Higher levels of 
copyright and trademark enforcement enable U.S. firms to confidently collaborate with 
unaffiliated companies by licensing their IP assets to them. This is because the U.S. company 
can safely anticipate that it will be able to effectively engage with the relevant IPR 
enforcement agencies in the host country and cease a copyright or trademark infringement 
case, by facing limited transaction costs (Hennart, 2000). In contrast, U.S. firms select to 
internally control and protect their copyright and trademark assets within affiliate subsidiaries 
when operating in countries that boast low levels of copyright and trademark enforcement 
strength. This is because the firms prefer to avoid licensing their assets to unaffiliated firms, 
fearing the market failure potential due to the external inefficiencies when attempting to 
monitor and enforce their copyright and trademarks in an external low enforcement market. 
This is the first empirical evidence that highlight the significant effect that copyright and 
trademark enforcement strength (as CSAs) have on the mode of internationalization of U.S. 
firms.  
Looking at the coefficients of the control variables, we find the majority of the 
variables to perform according to the established theoretical and empirical expectations. Both 
market size proxies used (GDP per capita and population) are found to have a highly 
significant positive effect on the dependent variable. This suggests that the larger the market 
size of a country, the higher the tendency and preference of US firm to license to affiliated 
(rather than unaffiliated) firms and is in line with theoretical expectations (Contractor, 1985; 
Page 15 of 28 European Journal of Innovation Management
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
For Peer Review
 
16 
 
Pfister and Deffains, 2005). Furthermore, the political risk, FDI openness and exchange rate 
volatility variables are also found to be highly significant and positively related to the ratio of 
affiliated to total licensing receipts. Countries with low political risk that are more open to 
FDI but experience higher levels of exchange rate volatility are found to experience higher 
levels of affiliated that unaffiliated licensing.  
In contrast, the investment freedom and Eurozone dummy variables are found to be 
highly significant but negatively related to the dependent variable. This suggests, therefore, 
that US firms operating in countries with fewer impediments to foreign investments as well 
as in the Eurozone are more likely to license their IP assets to unaffiliated parties rather than 
exploit them internally. Finally, the control variable capturing cultural distance has a highly 
significant, negative relationship with the dependent variable, suggesting that when cultural 
distance is high, firms would prefer to license their IP rights to external parties, in order to 
minimize the internal organisation transaction costs.  
 
5. Conclusions 
This paper explores the relationship between the trademark and copyright enforcement 
strength levels of 21 countries and the choice between unaffiliated and affiliated licensing of 
US firms using panel data analysis for the years 1998 to 2011. With the value of the IP assets 
of US firms rising over the last 20 years, the effectiveness and efficiency with which such 
firms are able to enforce their copyright and trademark rights in foreign countries affects the 
type of investment with which US firms will serve such markets. While the previous 
literature mainly focused on the effect of the strength of copyright and trademark regulations 
(not the enforcement) on licensing, this study uses two indices that measure copyright and 
trademark enforcement strength developed by Papageorgiadis (2010). We find stronger levels 
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of copyright and trademark enforcement to have a highly significant but negative effect on 
US licensing transaction abroad. This suggests that US firms are more likely to exhibit a 
greater tendency and preference for unaffiliated licensing when operating in markets where 
their copyright and trademark assets are more likely to be effectively and efficiently enforced. 
In contrast, in markets where the enforcement of IP rights is expected to generate high 
transaction costs and the outcome of the enforcement efforts is uncertain, US firms prefer to 
carry out a hierarchical mode of investment in a country, thereby protecting their IP rights 
internally. Since this study solely focuses on US licensing transactions abroad, future 
research should explore the effect of international copyright and trademark enforcement 
levels on the licensing transactions abroad from other countries. 
 The results reported in this paper have important implications for both the owners of 
IP assets and those countries that are recipients of IP licensing. In the context of strong 
copyright and trademark enforcement, we can anticipate that US firms will be willing to 
expand their global reach through unaffiliated licencing and have greater confidence in 
achieving an appropriate return on their assets. Global collaboration is supported through 
lower transaction costs as a consequence, with benefits for all parties concerned. In particular, 
the recipients of IP licences are likely to experience spill-over effects over time with positive 
implications related to their long term levels of economic growth. These effects will be 
particularly important in the context of developing and emerging markets where copyright 
and trademark enforcement is likely to be less rigorous than elsewhere. The implications are 
twofold: on the one hand, the results are important for US policy makers, since they provide 
them with a clearer picture of how US companies engaged in international licensing activities 
alter their structure as a reaction to the levels of copyright and trademark enforcement. On the 
other, trading partners with the U.S. who seek FDI or licensing agreements from U.S. 
companies may, ceteris paribus, vary their copyright and trademark enforcement practices 
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accordingly. For example, the results suggest that as copyright and trademark enforcement 
increases the propensity for US firms to use non-affiliate licensing to affiliate (FDI) rises and 
this might be one justification for looking to improve copyright and trademark enforcement 
levels in a country.  
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Table 1. Descriptive statistics  
Variables Mean Std.Dev. Min Max 
Trademark Enforcement 0.56 0.19 0.23 0.83 
Copyright Enforcement 0.65 0.16 0.38 0.901 
Geographic Distance 10423.5 4105.9 3038.5 16370.8 
Exchange Rate Volatility 0.487 0.50207 0.0001 2 
Cultural Distance 47.5 24.9 14 90 
Population 158.8 338.6 3.788 1321.052 
FDI Openness 46.09 65.05 0.63 577.1 
GDP per Capita 17457.9 14063.9 405.6 58513.2 
Investment Freedom 63.48 19.54 30 90 
Political Risk 9.14 1.36 5.33 12 
Ratio of Licensing Receipts by US 
Affiliates to Total Licencing Receipts 
0.95 0.07 0.61 100 
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Table 2. Correlation matrix 
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Distance 0.33 1 
FDI Openness 0.18 -0.11 1 
GDP per 
Capita -0.32 -0.25 0.23 1 
Population 0.09 0.03 -0.23 -0.41 1 
Exchange 
Rate Volatility -0.48 -0.21 -0.03 0.06 -0.29 1 
Investment 
Freedom -0.1 -0.15 0.34 0.36 -0.34 0.37 1 
Political Risk 0.19 -0.14 0.15 -0.04 0.12 0.04 0.03 1 
Ratio of 
Affiliate 
Licensing 
Receipts to 
Total  0.45 0.14 0.01 -0.56 0.14 -0.44 0.03 -0.01 1 
Copyright 
Enforcement 0.3 0.26 0.18 -0.08 -023 -0.21 
-
0.02 -0.04 -0.07 1 
Trademark 
Enforcement 0.24 0.33 0.14 0.25 -0.42 0.1 0.26 0.01 -0.14 0.56 1 
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Table 3. Regression estimation results of Fixed Effects specifications 
Variables Model 1  Model 2 
Trademark Enforcement -0.261(0.000)* - 
Copyright Enforcement - -0.077(0.000)* 
Geographic Distance -0.028(0.199) -0.015(0.256) 
Exchange rate volatility 0.084(0.000)* 0.022(0.000)* 
Cultural Distance -0.002(0.043)** -0.001(0.047) 
Population 0.017(0.000)* 0.018(0.000)* 
FDI openness 0.010(0.000)* 0.026(0.000)* 
GDP per capita 0.028(0.000)* 0.017(0.000)* 
Investment Freedom -0.004(0.001)* -0.024(0.000)* 
Political Risk 0.106(0.032)* 0.021(0.000)* 
Eurozone Dummy -0.005(0.001)* -0.014(0.002)* 
Constant term 0.612(0.000)* 0.752(0.000)* 
   
F-test (FE=0)
(1) 
3.76 2.73 
Wald Test
(2) 
                        34.8 25.4 
Hausman
(3) 
21.5 17.8 
R
2
 0.72 0.75 
Notes: (1) Test that all coefficients (except intercept and fixed effects) are jointly not 
significant. (2) Tests the joint significance of the fixed effects estimates. (3) Selection test 
between the Fixed Effects and the Random effects models. (*), (**) denote significance 
at the 1% and %% level respectively; t-statistics are given in parenthesis. 
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